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Editorial illustration for OpenAI Bans Russian, Iranian Accounts for Planting Fake News

OpenAI Bans Russian, Iranian Fake News Operations

• 4 min read

OpenAI banned a batch of ChatGPT accounts tied to a Russian operation called "Dark Clark" and an Iranian one called "Bogus Bylines," after its investigators found both groups using the chatbot to build fake personas and plant stories directly in legitimate news outlets. That's a departure from the usual playbook. Most influence campaigns OpenAI has caught so far leaned on social media bots and troll farms. This time the targets were real newsrooms in Latin America and online outlets worldwide, with fabricated audio, fake think tanks, and invented journalist bylines doing the work instead of viral posts.

The company's latest investigation report lays out how each operation used AI mostly behind the scenes, drafting internal talking points, translating propaganda for different markets, and occasionally generating social comments that barely moved the needle. The real damage came from content that made it past editors and into circulation, forcing fact-checkers and government officials in at least two countries to respond publicly. OpenAI tracks the fallout using its own Breakout Scale, a six-point system for measuring how far a disinformation campaign spreads before it's caught.

OpenAI exposed a Russian and an Iranian influence operation and banned the ChatGPT accounts involved. Both used fake identities to plant content in legitimate media rather than running social media campaigns, according to the company's investigation report.

Why this matters

The shift from bot farms to bylines is the part worth sitting with. Dark Clark and its Iranian counterpart weren't trying to flood feeds, they were trying to get fabricated claims printed by outlets with actual mastheads, which is a much harder problem for platforms to catch and a much more durable one once it works. For developers building on top of ChatGPT or similar models, this is a reminder that abuse detection can't stop at the API layer.

Banning accounts after the fact doesn't undo a fake story that already ran in a real outlet. For founders shipping AI writing or research tools, OpenAI's own findings are a preview of what regulators and newsrooms will start asking: not just "did you block bad actors" but "what did they get published before you noticed." Researchers tracking influence operations now have two documented playbooks from one company's disclosures alone. That's a data point worth more scrutiny than a press release, and worth watching for how fast other labs start publishing similar reports of their own.

Common Questions Answered

What were the Russian operation 'Dark Clark' and Iranian operation 'Bogus Bylines' using ChatGPT to accomplish?

Both operations used ChatGPT to create fake personas and plant fabricated stories directly into legitimate news outlets rather than relying on traditional social media bot tactics. This approach targeted real newsrooms in Latin America and online outlets worldwide, making it significantly harder for platforms to detect compared to typical influence campaigns.

How does the tactics used by Dark Clark and Bogus Bylines differ from previous influence operations OpenAI has encountered?

Most influence campaigns OpenAI previously caught relied on social media bots and troll farms to spread misinformation. Dark Clark and Bogus Bylines instead focused on infiltrating legitimate news outlets with fake bylines, which is a more sophisticated and durable strategy once successful because it leverages the credibility of established media sources.

Why is planting fake stories in legitimate news outlets considered a harder problem for platforms to catch?

Planting fabricated claims in outlets with actual mastheads is more difficult to detect because it operates outside the API layer and social media platforms where traditional abuse detection occurs. Once such content is published by credible news organizations, it becomes much more durable and difficult to identify as disinformation compared to obvious bot farm activity.

What does OpenAI's discovery of these operations reveal about abuse detection limitations?

The discovery demonstrates that abuse detection cannot stop at just the API layer, as bad actors can use ChatGPT accounts to conduct sophisticated influence operations targeting newsrooms directly. Developers building on ChatGPT or similar models need to implement broader monitoring strategies beyond account banning, since removing accounts after the fact doesn't prevent the damage already caused by planted stories.

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